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ARTICLE
Pamela A. Bresnahan & Lucian T. Pera
The Impact of Technological Developments on the Rules of
Attorney Ethics Regarding Attorney–Client Privilege,
Confidentiality, and Social Media
Abstract. This article focuses on the development of the law of ethics
and technology. Emphasis is placed on how technological developments
have affected the rules and means by which lawyers practice law and certain
ethical pitfalls that have developed hand-in-hand with technological
advancements. Topics examined include: (1) the ways by which electronic
communication has increased the potential for the attorney–client privilege
to be waived and the resulting impact on the present-day practice of law;
(2) the effect of social media on lawyers’ ethical obligations, including
counseling clients regarding the client’s use of social media and the lawyer’s
own use of social media; and (3) the impact of cloud computing on a
lawyer’s obligation to protect client confidences. The authors examine the
development of these technological effects on the practice of law through
an examination of the evolution of the American Bar Association, its Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, and state ethics opinions and representative
case law.
Authors. Pamela A. Bresnahan is a Partner and head of the litigation
practice group in the Washington D.C. office of Vorys, Sater, Seymour and
Pease LLP. Lucian T. Pera is a Partner in the Memphis, Tennessee office of
Adams and Reese LLP. The authors would like to thank Adam J. Singer, an
associate in the Washington D.C. office of Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease
LLP, for his assistance in preparing this Article.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Technological advancements continue to revolutionize the way modern
communication takes place and the way in which people access and utilize
information. Such advancements impact almost all industries. The practice
of law is no exception. Lawyers and law firms now communicate with each
other and with clients by electronic means, utilize mobile devices, maintain
electronic files, and even store client information “in the cloud.” While new
technologies provide lawyers and law firms with faster and more efficient
means to practice law, they present new challenges for lawyers and law firms
to comply with their ethical obligations. In many instances, the ethical rules
that govern lawyers were developed prior to the implementation of new
technologies that have since become commonplace in other areas of life.
Indeed, the American Bar Association (ABA) formed the “Commission on
Ethics 20/20”1 in 2009, which recognizes that “[t]echnological advances and
1. See ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20, A.B.A, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
professional_responsibility/aba_commission_on_ethics_20_20/about_us.html (last visited Dec. 19,
2016) (“The ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 was created by then ABA President Carolyn B. Lamm
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globalization have changed our profession in ways not yet reflected in our
ethics codes and regulatory structure.”2
This Article examines how certain technological developments have
affected ethics in the practice of law. Part I discusses on the impact of
technology on the concept of attorney–client privilege and the resulting
ethical implications. Part II focuses on ethical issues that arise with the use
of social media, including the use of social media by clients and by lawyers.
Part III focuses on the obligations of lawyers to protect client confidences
when using new technology, with an emphasis on the use of cloud
computing.3
II. TECHNOLOGY AND THE ATTORNEY–CLIENT PRIVILEGE
While technological developments have provided lawyers and their
clients with an increased ability to communicate with each other, those
developments also allow for increased opportunities for third parties to gain
access to communications between a lawyer and a client. Consequently,
communication by electronic means carries with it the greater potential for
the attorney–client privilege not to attach to communications between a
lawyer and a client in the first place or for the privilege to be waived. This
Section examines the means by which the attorney–client privilege can fail
to attach or be waived by the use of modern technology and the resulting
implication on a lawyer’s ethical obligations.
The attorney–client privilege protects communications between an
attorney and client “for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal
assistance for the client.”4 Confidential communications are those that are
“not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than in the course of
rendering legal services to the client or transmitting the communications by
reasonably necessary means.”5
to perform a thorough review of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the U.S. system
of lawyer regulation in the context of advances in technology and global legal practice developments.”).
2. Michael E. Lackey Jr. & Joseph P. Minta, Lawyers and Social Media: The Legal Ethics of Tweeting,
Facebooking and Blogging, 28 TOURO L. REV. 149, 154 (2012) (quoting Press Release, ABA, ABA
President Carolyn B. Lamm Creates Ethics Comm’n to Address Tech. and Global Practice Challenges
Facing U.S. Lawyers (Aug. 4, 2009)).
3. Unless noted otherwise, references herein to the “Rules of Professional Conduct” or a
particular rule of professional conduct refer to the current American Bar Association Model Rules of
Professional Conduct.
4. In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam).
5. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Christian Coal., 178 F.R.D. 61, 66 (E.D. Va. 1998), aff’d in part,
modified in part, 178 F.R.D. 456 (E.D. Va. 1998); see also United States v. (Under Seal), 748 F.2d 871, 874
n.6 (4th Cir. 1984) (stating the Supreme Court Standard 503(a)(4) is “[a confidential]
communication . . . not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those to whom disclosure
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The work–product doctrine, the “inseparable twin” to the attorney–client
privilege, protects a lawyer’s “mental impressions, opinions, and/or legal
theories concerning litigation.”6 In United States v. Nobles,7 the Supreme
Court of the United States recognized that the work–product doctrine
protects not only materials prepared by an attorney, but also those prepared
by agents for an attorney.8 This recognition was grounded in the fact that
“attorneys often must rely on the assistance of investigators and other agents
in the compilation of materials in preparation for trial.”9 Although the
work–product doctrine is a separate concept from the attorney–client
privilege, the same principles recognized by the Nobles Court also apply to
the attorney–client privilege.10
With the advent of modern technology and the use of new technologies
in the practice of law, lawyers are now employing agents for new and
previously unforeseen purposes, such as storing client files “in the cloud.”
Recognizing the new purposes for which technology providers are being
utilized, the ABA amended the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in
2012 “to reflect the changing role of technology in legal practice and
specifically recognized the need for reliance on such technology providers
in supplying legal services.”11 For example, Comment 3 to Model Rule 5.3,
which generally governs a lawyer’s responsibility to oversee non-lawyer
assistants of all kinds, now includes the following language:
A lawyer may use nonlawyers outside the firm to assist the lawyer in rendering
legal services to the client. Examples include the retention of an investigative
or paraprofessional service, hiring a document management company to
create and maintain a database for complex litigation, sending client
documents to a third party for printing or scanning, and using an Internet-

is in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal services to the client or those reasonably
necessary for the transmission of the communication”).
6. NXIVM Corp. v. O’Hara, 241 F.R.D. 109, 126 (N.D.N.Y. 2007).
7. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975).
8. Id. at 238 (“It is therefore necessary that the [work-product] doctrine protect
material prepared by agents for the attorney as well as those prepared by the attorney
himself.”).
9. Id.
10. Fed. Election Comm’n, 178 F.R.D. at 66 (listing the requirements for a document to be
protected under attorney–client privilege).
11. Troutman Sanders LLP, Breaking the Seal: Does Using Third Party eDiscovery Vendors Raise Privilege
and
Work
Product Issues?, INFO. INTERSECTION
(July 17,
2014), http://www.
informationintersection.com/2014/07/breaking-the-seal-does-using-third-party-ediscovery-vendorsraise-privilege-and-work-product-issues/.
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based service to store client information.12

However, the way in which technology providers are now being used to
assist lawyers and law firms necessitates an examination of the concept of
attorney–client privilege and confidentiality in the digital age. Consistent
with Nobles, the attorney–client privilege will extend to protect otherwise
privileged communications where a lawyer or a law firm shares those
communications with a vendor deemed necessary to facilitate the
representation.13 Thus, a law firm generally will not be deemed to have
waived information protected by the attorney–client privilege by
“contracting with an independent contractor . . . to provide a necessary
service that the law firm feels it needs in order to effectively represent its
clients.”14
While a law firm’s legitimate use of technology providers to assist in its
practice may not jeopardize the attorney–client privilege, a client’s decision
to use certain technology, in connection with that client’s communications
with counsel, might be more precarious.15 For example, under certain
circumstances, a client or potential client’s communications with a lawyer or
potential lawyer by e-mail may not be protected by the attorney–client
privilege.16 Generally, e-mail communications between an attorney and
client or potential client will be protected by attorney–client privilege, so
long as the communication was for the purpose of securing legal assistance
or advice.17 However, that may not be the case where the client utilizes an
e-mail account or computer belonging to their employer.
In Holmes v. Petrovich Development Corp.,18 an employee’s (Ms. Holmes) email communications with counsel were found to not be protected by the
attorney–client privilege. The employee, who filed suit against her employer
for sexual harassment, retaliation, wrongful termination, violation of her
12. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.3 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
13. Id. (“When retaining or directing a nonlawyer outside the firm, a lawyer should communicate
directions appropriate under the circumstances to give reasonable assurance that the nonlawyer’s
conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer.”).
14. Compulit v. Banctec, Inc., 177 F.R.D. 410, 412 (W.D. Mich. 1997).
15. See Holmes v. Petrovich Dev. Co., 191 Cal. App. 4th 1047, 1047 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (holding
an employee’s e-mail communications with her attorney using her employer’s computer are not
protected by attorney–client privilege).
16. Id.
17. See Wultz v. Bank of China, 979 F. Supp. 2d 479, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“‘In order to prevail
on an assertion of the attorney–client privilege the party invoking the privilege’ must show [they sought
the communication with the lawyer] . . . ‘for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on
law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding . . . .’” (quoting Colton v. United
States, 306 F.2d 633, 637 (2d Cir. 1962))).
18. Holmes v. Petrovich Dev.Co., 191 Cal. App. 4th 1047 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
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right to privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, had used
the employer’s company computer to e-mail an attorney regarding her
potential claims.19 The court determined that the communications between
Ms. Holmes and her attorney were not privileged because they were not
confidential communications.20
Under the circumstances, the
communications were not transmitted in a manner protected from
disclosure to third persons other than those necessary to further the interest
of the client.21 Although privileged communications do not lose their
privileged character by virtue of the fact that they were sent by e-mail, the
court concluded that such communications are not privileged where:
(1) . . . the electronic means used belongs to the defendant; (2) the defendant
has advised the plaintiff that communications using electronic means are not
private, may be monitored, and may be used only for business purposes; and
(3) the plaintiff is aware of and agrees to these conditions.22

Because Ms. Holmes used the company computer, knowing that this use
violated company computer policy and that they could be discovered due to
company monitoring of e-mail use, Ms. Holmes’ e-mails were “akin to
consulting her lawyer in her employer’s conference room, in a loud voice,
with the door open, so that any reasonable person would expect that their
discussion of her complaints about her employer would be overheard by
him.”23
Further, Ms. Holmes’ subjective belief that her e-mail communications
with her attorney were private did not alter the result. Ms. Holmes believed
the communications were “private because she utilized a private password
to use the company computer and she deleted the e-mails after they were
sent.”24 However, the company’s e-mail policy made that belief objectively
unreasonable.25Ms. Holmes was “warned that the company would monitor
e-mail to ensure employees were complying with office policy not to use
company computers for personal matters, and she was told that she had no
expectation of privacy in any messages she sent via the company
computer.”26 Additionally, Ms. Holmes’ belief that the company did not,
19. Id. at 1056.
20. Id. at 1068.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1069.
24. Id. at 1069.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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in reality, monitor e-mail in accordance with the written policy did not alter
the analysis. The court stated that “[a]bsent a company communication to
employees explicitly contradicting the company’s warning to them that
company computers are monitored to make sure employees are not using
them to send personal e-mail, it is immaterial that the ‘operational reality’ is
the company does not actually do so.”27 Such an “operational reality”
scenario was seen as an unreasonable belief on the part of the employee,
analogous to one believing that he or she is able to exceed a speed limit with
impunity merely because a particular roadway is seldom patrolled.28
In a slightly different fact pattern, Marina Stengart (Ms. Stengart) filed an
employment discrimination lawsuit against her employer, Loving Care
Agency, Inc. (Loving Care).29 In anticipation of discovery, Loving Care
hired a computer forensic expert to recover files stored on the companyissued laptop Ms. Stengart used while employed at Loving Care.30 Among
the files stored on that laptop were e-mails Ms. Stengart had exchanged with
her attorney.31 Although Ms. Stengart sent and received those e-mails by
her personal, password-protected, web-based e-mail account, and did not
use her company e-mail account, the company-issued laptop had
automatically saved the e-mails to its hard drive.32 While she did not intend
for copies of the e-mails to be saved, default settings on the Internet
browser, unbeknownst to her, automatically saved copies of her browsing
sessions while she used her personal e-mail account.33 In contrast with
Holmes, the Supreme Court of New Jersey ultimately determined that the emails between Ms. Stengart and her attorney were protected by the
attorney–client privilege and that the privilege had not been waived.34
Loving Care’s employee handbook noted that the company “reserves and
will exercise the right to review, audit, intercept, access, and disclose all
matters on the company’s media systems and services at any time, with or
without notice.”35 Loving Care contended that the language of the policy
precluded its employees from having an expectation of privacy in their use
of Loving Care’s computers.36 The court, however, noted that it was not
27. Id. at 1071.
28. Id.
29. Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650, 655 (N.J. 2010).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 655–56.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 655.
35. Id. at 657.
36. Id. at 658.
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clear whether the policy covered an employee’s use of personal, passwordprotected, web-based e-mail because the policy did not address personal email accounts.37 Therefore, employees did “not have express notice that
messages sent or received on a personal, web-based e-mail account [were]
subject to monitoring if company equipment [was] used to access the
account.”38 The policy also did not provide notice that such e-mails would
be stored on the company computer’s hard drive.39 The court ultimately
determined that Ms. Stengart had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
e-mails exchanged with her attorney.40 First, Ms. Stengart had a subjective
expectation of privacy, because she took steps to protect the privacy of the
e-mails by using a personal, password-protected e-mail account and did not
save her account password on the company computer.41 Her expectation
of privacy was found to be objectively reasonable because Loving Care’s
policy did not address the use of private, web-based e-mails and did not
inform employees that Loving Care could retrieve these e-mails.42 Thus,
the e-mails were protected by the attorney–client privilege.43
The takeaway from Holmes and Stengart is that the language of an
employer’s policy is instrumental in determining whether the attorney–client
privilege will attach to communications between an employee and an
attorney when such communications are sent or received using the
employer’s equipment. The language of the policy will likely determine
whether the employee’s subjective expectation of privacy is objectively
reasonable. In Stengart, the court concluded that the language of the policy
did not give Ms. Stengart “cause to anticipate that Loving Care would be
peering over her shoulder as she opened e-mails from her lawyer on her
personal, password-protected Yahoo account.”44 Therefore, the court
implied that had the policy provided Ms. Stengart with notice that Loving
Care would “peer over her shoulder,” her expectation of privacy might not
have been objectively reasonable.45 Thus, under circumstances where
company policy provides clear notice regarding e-mail usage, such as the
notice provided in Holmes, it is crucial that employees not use company e-

37. Id. at 659.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 663.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 664.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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mail to communicate with their attorneys.46
Lawyers rarely know, however, the content of the employer policies that
might govern a client’s use of an employer-issued computer, smartphone,
or tablet computer, or even the current state of the law on the interpretation
of those policies in jurisdictions whose law might apply.47 Of course, it
follows that lawyers representing clients who regularly use technology
belonging to others must consider advising their clients about the risks
involved, and more importantly, should seriously consider having a
conversation with clients about how and with what technology they will
communicate about any confidential or sensitive matters.48 Some
lawyers—especially perhaps older lawyers—may find it strange that a lawyer
today should think about and actually discuss with a client at the outset of
representation what technology they will use to communicate, but having
such a conversation is becoming more important with each new change in
the technologies clients and lawyers use.49
Ethics opinions also point lawyers in this direction.50 ABA Model Rule
of Professional Conduct 1.1 requires an attorney to provide competent
representation to a client and ABA Model Rule 1.6 requires an attorney to
protect the confidentiality of information relating to the representation of a
client.51 Because the attorney–client privilege might not attach to electronic
communications sent or received using an employer’s computer, the ABA
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility has
concluded that ABA Model Rules 1.1 and 1.6 require an attorney to warn a

46. Holmes v. Petrovich Dev. Co., 191 Cal. App. 4th 1047, 1068 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (clarifying
the use of e-mail to communicate with an attorney falls under the attorney–client privilege unless “the
electronic means used belongs to the defendant[,] the defendant has advised the plaintiff that
communications using electronic means are not private . . . [and] the plaintiff is aware of and agrees to
these conditions”).
47. Jonathan Levy, Note, Employee E-Mails and the Concept of Earning the Privilege, J. L. & POL’Y FOR
INFO. SOC’Y 245, 247 (2013) (“Courts addressing the applicability of the attorney–client privilege to
employees who communicate with their attorneys via e-mail on an employer’s computer have come
up with a variety of conclusions.”).
48. See Holmes, 191 Cal. App. 4th at 1056 (recounting a situation where an attorney advised
against the use of client’s work computer for attorney–client communications from the beginning of
the consultation and proposed a conversation over the phone instead).
49. See Steven Masur, Confidentiality in a High-Tech World, GP SOLO (July/Aug. 2007),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/publications/gp_solo_magazine_home/gp_solo_
magazine_index/confidentiality.html (noting the potential risk of inadvertent disclosure of a client’s
confidential information “[i]n our era of virtual offices, shared office spaces, and the continuing tide
of ever-evolving technologies”).
50. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-459 (2011) (discussing the
attorney’s duty to protect the confidentiality of e-mail communication with clients).
51. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1, 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
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client regarding the client’s use of e-mail in appropriate circumstances.52
The Committee stated that:
A lawyer sending or receiving substantive communications with a client via email or other electronic means ordinarily must warn the client about the risk
of sending or receiving electronic communications using a computer or other
device, or e-mail account, where there is a significant risk that a third party
may gain access. In the context of representing an employee, this obligation
arises, at the very least, when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know
that the client is likely to send or receive substantive client-lawyer
communications via e-mail or other electronic means, using a business device
or system under circumstances where there is a significant risk that the
communications will be read by the employer or another third party.53

Regardless of whether such communications are legally protected by
attorney–client privilege in the relevant jurisdiction, the Committee
determined that:
[A] lawyer should . . . advise [an] employee-client “about the importance of
communicating with the lawyer in a manner that protects the confidentiality
of email communications, just as a lawyer should avoid speaking face-to-face
with a client about sensitive matters if the conversation might be overheard
and should warn the client against discussing their communications with
others.”54

The warning becomes necessary because of the risk that such
communications will be reviewed by others or found to be admissible in
judicial proceedings.55 Consistent with workplace realities today, the
Committee observed that, unless a lawyer has reason to believe otherwise, a
lawyer “ordinarily should assume that an employer’s internal policy allows
for access to the employee’s e-mails sent to or from a workplace device or
system.”56
Although the employee-client is the predominant scenario, it is not the
only circumstance under which a lawyer’s ethical obligations may require a
lawyer to warn a client about the use of electronic communications. Any
time there is a risk that a client might send or receive attorney–client
communications from a device or account to which a third party may gain
52. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-459 (2011).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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access, such an ethical obligation will arise. Consider, for example, the client
engaged in divorce proceedings who shares a home computer or iPad with
other family members or the client in a business dispute with a partner who
might use the business’ e-mail system for e-mail communications. The
Committee concluded that:
Whenever a lawyer communicates with a client by e-mail, the lawyer must first
consider whether, given the client’s situation, there is a significant risk that
third parties will have access to the communications. If so, the lawyer must
take reasonable care to protect the confidentiality of the communications by
giving appropriately tailored advice to the client.57

III. THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL MEDIA ON LAWYER’S ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS
Multiple rules of professional conduct are implicated by the use of social
media. A lawyer’s ethical obligations may be affected as a result of a client’s
use of social media or the lawyer’s own use of social media. Consequently,
multiple state bar associations have begun to issue guidance on the ways in
which lawyers’ ethical obligations apply to the use of social media.
A. A Client’s Use of Social Media
A client’s use of social media may affect the attorney–client privilege in a
different way than the client’s use of employer e-mail. In contrast to the
potential for the attorney–client privilege not to attach in the latter instance
(where a client uses an employer’s computer or e-mail system to send or
receive electronic communications with an attorney), a client’s use of social
media or other forms of online communication create the potential for the
attorney–client privilege to be waived with respect to communications in
which the privilege has previously attached.58 Use of social media may also
provide ammunition to a party’s opponent, because of a client’s
misunderstanding about the level of confidentiality of the client’s online
communications and their legal ramifications.59
In Lenz v. Universal Music Corp.,60 comments posted by the plaintiff on a
57. Id.
58. See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., No. 5:07-cv-03783 JF (PVT), 2010 WL 4789099, at *5
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2010) (“A party may not attempt to explain an apparent admission [posted on a
social media outlet] as a misinterpretation of a conversation with counsel, and then deny the opposing
party on the basis of privilege access to the very conversations at issue.”) enforcing No. C-0703783 JF
(PVT), 2010 WL 4286329 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2010).
59. See id. (“When a client reveals to a third party that something is ‘what my lawyer thinks,’ she
cannot avoid discovery on the basis that the communication was confidential.”).
60. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., No. 5:07-CV-03783 JF (PVT), 2010 WL 4789099 (N.D. Cal.
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blog regarding certain communications with her counsel constituted waiver
of the attorney–client privilege as to those communications.61 There,
Stephanie Lenz (Ms. Lenz) sued Universal Music Corporation (Universal)
after the website YouTube complied with a takedown notice sent to it by
Universal.62 The takedown notice alleged that a home video, uploaded to
YouTube by Ms. Lenz, infringed on Universal’s copyright in the Prince song
Let’s Go Crazy.63 Thereafter, Ms. Lenz sued Universal, alleging that
Universal knowingly misrepresented that her video infringed upon
Universal’s copyright.64 In response to Ms. Lenz making comments on her
blog, in e-mails, and in electronic “chats” with friends, as well as statements
to reporters, Universal moved to compel discovery relating to the
conversations that Ms. Lenz discussed.65
One of Ms. Lenz’s
communications to a friend stated that Ms. Lenz’s counsel was “very, very
interested in the case” and “is pretty well salivating over getting their teeth
into [Universal].”66 Ms. Lenz also wrote to her mother that her counsel
planned a “publicity blitz and/or lawsuit against Universal.”67 Universal
contended that Ms. Lenz’s communications with third parties revealed that
her motivations for filing the lawsuit were to give her attorneys an
opportunity to “get [] their teeth into [Universal],” and not to vindicate her
First Amendment rights.68 Ms. Lenz countered that the comments only
revealed information regarding her attorneys’ motives for representing her
pro bono, not her own motivations for filing suit.69 The magistrate judge
disagreed with Ms. Lenz and found that her communications related to the
substance of her conversations with counsel.70 The magistrate, therefore,
determined the attorney–client privilege had been waived and ordered
further discovery regarding Ms. Lenz’s communications, a determination
that the district court affirmed.71
Nov. 17, 2010), enforcing No. C 07-03783 JF (PVT), 2010 WL 4286329 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2010).
61. Id. at *1.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at *2.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at *3.
70. See id. at *2 (citing Judge Trumbell’s decision that Universal is owed further discovery
concerning those attorney–client conversations since Lenz’s communication to third parties revealed
the actual substance of attorney–client discourse).
71. See id. (upholding the court’s order granting defendant’s motion to compel production of
privileged testimony).
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In McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc.,72 Bill R. McMillen, Sr.
(Mr. McMillen) filed suit to recover damages for injuries sustained during a
cool down lap at a stock car race.73 Defendant, Hummingbird Speedway,
Inc. (Hummingbird) asked Mr. McMillen, in an interrogatory, whether he
belonged to any social networking websites, and if so, to provide his user
name and password to such websites.74 Mr. McMillen responded by stating
that he belonged to Facebook and MySpace but that he would not provide
his login credentials.75 Hummingbird and the other defendants filed a
motion to compel after their review of the public portions of
Mr. McMillen’s Facebook page revealed Mr. McMillen had made comments
about a fishing trip and his attendance at the Daytona 500 race.76
Defendants contended such comments on the publicly-accessible portion
of Mr. McMillen’s Facebook page provided cause to believe that the nonpublicly accessible portions of Mr. McMillen’s social media accounts might
contain additional evidence relevant to Mr. McMillen’s claim for damages.77
Mr. McMillen argued that communications shared with one’s private friends
on social media are confidential and should be protected from disclosure.78
The court determined while each website at issue provided a certain level of
privacy by allowing users the opportunity to choose which posts are public
and which are shared only with identified persons, “their terms and privacy
policies should dispel any notion that information one chooses to share,
even if only with one friend, will not be disclosed to anybody else.”79 Users
are put on notice that their communications may be disseminated by those
users with whom a post is shared.80 Additionally, the operators of social
networking websites have access to each post.81 Thus, “[w]ithout more, the
complete access afforded to the Facebook and MySpace operators defeats
McMillen’s proposition that his communications are confidential [and t]he
law does not even protect otherwise privileged communications made in the

72. McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., No. 113-2010 CD, 2010 WL 4403285 (Pa. Com.
Pl. Sept. 9, 2010).
73. Id. at *1.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at *1–2.
78. Id. at *2.
79. Id. at *3–4.
80. Id. at *4. See generally Data Policy, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/
(last visited Dec. 19, 2016).
81. McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., No. 113-2010 CD, 2010 WL 4403285, at *4–5
(Pa. Com. Pl. Sept. 9, 2010).
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presence of third parties.”82 Therefore, the court concluded that Facebook
and MySpace users have consented to their posts being reviewed by a third
party, the site operators, which is “wholly incommensurate with a claim of
confidentiality.”83 Because the public portions of Mr. McMillen’s social
media revealed content suggesting that Mr. McMillen may have exaggerated
his injuries, it was reasonable to assume that the private portions might
contain additional information relevant to the defendants’ defense.84
Accordingly, the court ordered Mr. McMillen to provide to defense counsel
his user names and passwords, and told him to not take any steps to delete
or alter information on his Facebook and MySpace accounts.85
Not surprisingly, the risks that social media might present to a client’s
case, such as what occurred in McMillen, has caused state bar associations to
examine attorneys’ ethical obligations regarding a client’s use of social
media. The Pennsylvania Bar Association has concluded that competent
representation, pursuant to the Pennsylvania version of Rule 1.1 of the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct generally requires a lawyer to “advise
clients about the content of their social media accounts, including privacy
issues, as well as their clients’ obligation to preserve information that may
be relevant to their legal disputes.”86 Further, it is reasonable to expect that
opposing counsel will monitor a client’s use of social media and, therefore,
it may be appropriate to track one’s own client in order to stay informed of
potential developments in a case.87
With respect to the advice a lawyer may provide to a client regarding the
client’s use of social media, bar associations that have examined the topic
have generally concluded that a lawyer may advise a client to change social
media privacy settings and may also advise a client regarding what content
should be made private or be removed from the client’s social media
pages.88 The Florida Bar Association has even concluded a lawyer may
82. Id. at *5.
83. Id.
84. Id. at *6.
85. Id. at *8.
86. See Pa. Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility Comm., Formal Op. 2014-300 (2014)
(indicating a lawyer’s duty includes advising clients about the content of their social media activity as
it relates to privacy and preservation thereof, especially with regard to legal disputes); see also MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (discussing a lawyer’s duty to provide
competent advice to clients).
87. Pa. Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility Comm., Formal Op. 2014-300 (2014).
88. See id. (confirming a lawyer may ethically advise a client to modify privacy settings on social
media platforms, and remove content provided there is no violation of statutes, rules, or common law
relating to evidence preservation); see also Fla. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Ethics Comm., Op. 14-1 (2015)
(protecting lawyers’ abilities within the law to advise clients to maximize privacy settings on their social
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advise a client to remove content from the client’s social media that is
relevant to a foreseeable judicial proceeding.89 However, a lawyer may only
provide such advice if the information or data to be removed is preserved.90
When it is permissible for a lawyer to counsel a client to remove certain
information from social media, the Philadelphia Bar Association has warned
that the lawyer must also “take appropriate action to preserve the
information in the event it should prove to be relevant and discoverable.”91
Additionally, ethics opinions have determined that “[a] [lawyer] may not
advise a client to post false or misleading [content].”92 Also, a lawyer may
not offer evidence of social media content in a judicial proceeding that the
lawyer knows is false.93 Doing so violates Rule 4.1 of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, which prohibits a lawyer from “mak[ing] false
statement[s] of material fact or law.”94
B. A Lawyer’s Use of Social Media
The pervasiveness of social media in recent years has sparked ethics
opinions to address not only the advice lawyers should provide to clients
regarding social media use, but also the permissible ways in which attorneys
may use social media in their own practices. Social media websites have
been described as having become “indispensable tools used by legal
professionals and those with whom they communicate.”95 The rapid
growth of social media has even prompted the Commercial and Federal
media platforms and to remove content where a duty to preserve evidence under law does not exist);
accord N.Y. Cnty. Lawyer Ass’n Prof’l Ethics Comm., Op. 745 (2013) (clarifying an attorney’s
competent duty to advise clients concerning social media privacy settings, and permitting lawyers to
advise clients against posting certain content on public and/or private pages and whether content may
be removed, provided that there is no violation of rules or substantive law regarding evidence
preservation).
89. See Fla. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Ethics Comm., Op. 14-1 (2015).
90. Id. (“The [Florida Bar] is of the opinion that if the inquirer does so, the social media
information or data must be preserved if the information or data is known by the inquirer or reasonably
should be known by the inquirer to be relevant to the reasonably foreseeable proceeding.”).
91. Phila. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Guidance Comm., Op. 2014-5 (2014).
92. See Pa. Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility Comm., Formal Op. 2014-300 (2014)
(“[A]n attorney may not advise a client to post false or misleading information on a social networking
website; nor may an attorney offer evidence from a social networking website that the attorney knows
is false.”).
93. Id.
94. Id. (enforcing Rule 4.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct); accord MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.1(a) (AM. B. ASS’N 2016) (proscribing lawyers from knowingly falsifying
information to third persons).
95. James M. Wicks et al., Social Media Ethics Guidelines, COM. & FED. LITIG. SEC., N.Y. ST. B.
ASS’N 1 (Updated June, 9 2015), http://www.nysba.org/Sections/Commercial_Federal_Litigation/
Com_Fed_PDFs/Social_Media_Ethics_Guidelines.html.
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Litigation Section of the New York State Bar Association to recommend a
useful set of guidelines regarding the ethical implications of a lawyer’s use
of social media.96
As part of its mandate to update the ABA Model Rules in light of
technological changes, the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 focused on
rules relating to attorney advertising, a topic commonly implicated by a
lawyer’s use of social media.97 As a result, the Commission recommended
certain changes to the comments of Rule 7.2 of the Model Rule of
Professional Conduct, which were adopted by the ABA.98 Specifically, the
Commission proposed adding “‘the Internet, and other forms of electronic
communication’” to the list of ‘powerful media’” found in the comments to
Rule 7.2.99 Comment 3 to ABA Model Rule 7.2 now reads as follows:
Questions of effectiveness and taste in advertising are matters of speculation
and subjective judgment. Some jurisdictions have had extensive prohibitions
against television and other forms of advertising, against advertising going
beyond specified facts about a lawyer, or against “undignified” advertising.
Television, the Internet, and other forms of electronic communication are
now among the most powerful media for getting information to the public,
particularly persons of low and moderate income; prohibiting television,
Internet, and other forms of electronic advertising, therefore, would impede
the flow of information about legal services to many sectors of the public.
Limiting the information that may be advertised has a similar effect and
assumes that the bar can accurately forecast the kind of information that the
public would regard as relevant. But see Rule 7.3(a) for the prohibition against
a solicitation through a real-time electronic exchange initiated by the
lawyer.100

Although perhaps a minor clarification, the inclusion of the phrase “the
Internet, and other forms of communication” in Comment 3 has been
noted by ethics opinions which have concluded that attorneys may advertise
using social media, in compliance with Rule 7.2.101 For instance, the West
Virginia Bar Disciplinary Board concluded that social media advertising was
96. Id.
97. See Lackey, Jr. & Minta, supra note 2, at 160 (discussing how social media innovations caused
the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 to conduct an in-depth study of attorney advertising under the
ABA Model Rules).
98. See id. (referencing comment three on Rule 7.2 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct).
99. Id. at 161 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.2 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013)).
100. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.2 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
101 Id.
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permissible, pursuant to West Virginia Rule of Professional Conduct 7.2,
because social media advertising “constitutes advertising via the Internet
and/or electronic communication.”102 In support of its conclusion, the
West Virginia Lawyer Disciplinary Board stated:
Indeed, Comment [3] to Rule 7.2 pointedly notes that “[t]elevision, the
Internet, and other forms of electronic communication are now among the
most powerful media for getting information to the public, particularly
persons of low and moderate income; prohibiting television, Internet, and
other forms of electronic advertising, therefore, would impede the flow of
information about legal services to many sectors of the public.”103

Therefore, attorneys may generally use social media as a platform to
advertise their services, but must, of course, do so in compliance with the
rules regarding attorney advertising.104 For instance, a lawyer “shall not
advertise areas of practice under headings in social media platforms that
include the terms ‘specialist,’ unless the lawyer is certified by the appropriate
accrediting body in the particular area.”105 The New York City Bar recently
adopted a five-element test to determine whether a lawyer’s LinkedIn profile
or other social media content constituted attorney advertising.106 The Bar
concluded that a LinkedIn profile constitutes attorney advertising if the
following criteria are met: (1) the LinkedIn content is a communication
made by or on behalf of the lawyer; (2) the primary purpose of the content
is to attract new clients to retain the lawyer for pecuniary gain; (3) the
content relates to the legal services offered by the lawyer; (4) the content is
intended to be viewed by potential new clients; and (5) the content does not
fall within any recognized exception to the definition of attorney
advertising.107
Social media has become a popular and effective way for lawyers to
market their services. However, the nature of social media typically allows
not only the lawyer/account holder, but also third parties, to post
information on the lawyer’s social media presence. For example, certain
social media websites allow users to submit reviews, recommendations or
102. W. Va. Law. Disciplinary Bd., Op. 2015-02 (2015).
103. Id. (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.2 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
104. W. Va. Law. Disciplinary Bd., Op. 2015-02 (2015).
105. Wicks et al., supra note 95, at 7.
106. See N.Y. City B. Prof’l Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 2015-7 (2015) (“An attorney’s individual
LinkedIn profile or other content constitutes attorney advertising only if it meets all five of the
following criteria . . . .”).
107. Id.
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endorsements of a lawyer’s services.108 The ability of third parties to post
content to a lawyer’s social media page could lead to violations of the
lawyer’s ethical duties if the lawyer is not vigilant in monitoring what others
post on the lawyer’s behalf. For example, Rule 8.4(c) prohibits a lawyer
from “[engaging] in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation.”109 Accordingly, content posted by lawyers on their
social media pages must be true, accurate, and non-misleading. Ethics
opinions have concluded that lawyers also have an obligation to ensure that
content posted to their social media pages by others meets this high standard
set for lawyers. For example, the Pennsylvania Bar Association determined
that a lawyer should: “(1) monitor his or her social [media] websites,
(2) . . . verify the accuracy of any information posted, and (3) . . . remove or
correct any inaccurate endorsements.”110
While social media provides a marketing platform to feature
endorsements or recommendations of a lawyer’s services, it may also
provide a platform for unsatisfied clients to post content that could harm a
lawyer’s reputation or practice. Lawyers who come across a negative review,
while monitoring their social media presence, may feel inclined to respond
to protect their practice from the damage such a review might cause.
However, responding in-kind could cause attorneys to reveal confidential
information, in violation of Rule 1.6.111 In fact, lawyers have been
disciplined for doing so.
For example, a proposed mild form of discipline for one lawyer was
rejected as too lenient by the Supreme Court of Georgia, where the lawyer
had posted personal and confidential information about a former client in
response to a negative review.112 In her petition for voluntary discipline,
Ms. Skinner admitted to “[violating] Rule 1.6 of the Georgia Rules of
Professional Conduct” and requested the mildest form of punishment
available in Georgia for doing so.113 The court rejected Ms. Skinner’s
request.114 Following rejection of Ms. Skinner’s petition, a special master
108. See Pa. Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility Comm., Formal Op. 2014-300 (2014)
(noting certain social networking cites permit clients to review, recommend, or endorse attorneys).
109. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(c) (Am. B. Ass’n 1983).
110. Pa. Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility Comm., Formal Op. 2014-300 (2014).
111. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2016) (stating attorneys
cannot reveal a client’s information except in specific circumstances).
112. See In re Skinner, 740 S.E.2d 171, 171–73 (Ga. 2013) (per curiam) (rejecting the mildest form
of discipline for an attorney that posted personal and confidential information about a former client
even though the post was in self defense).
113. Id. at 172–73.
114.Id. at 173.
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conducted an evidentiary hearing and concluded that Ms. Skinner had
violated Rule 1.6 among other rules.115 After a client whom Ms. Skinner
was representing in an uncontested divorce discharged Ms. Skinner and
hired new counsel, the client posted negative reviews of Ms. Skinner on
three consumer Internet pages.116 Ms. Skinner subsequently posted a
response to the client’s reviews, which “contained personal and confidential
information about her former client that Skinner had obtained in the course
of her representation of the client.”117 “In particular, Skinner identified the
client by name, identified the employer of the client, stated how much the
client had paid Skinner, identified the county in which the divorce had been
filed, and stated that the client had a boyfriend.”118 After noting there were
significant mitigating circumstances involving personal problems
experienced by Ms. Skinner during her representation of the client and at
the time she posted the confidential information, the Supreme Court of
Georgia ordered Ms. Skinner to receive a public reprimand and to consult
with the state’s law practice management services.119
The Hearing Board of the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary
Commission similarly reprimanded an attorney who responded
inappropriately to a negative online client review.120 Ms. Tsamis had
represented a client in securing unemployment benefits from the client’s
former employer.121 The client terminated Ms. Tsamis’ representation after
the Illinois Department of Employment Security denied the client’s claim
for unemployment benefits and, thereafter, posted a negative review of
Ms. Tsamis on the legal referral website AVVO.122 Although AVVO
removed the client’s post, the client subsequently posted a second negative
review to which Ms. Tsamis replied.123 Ms. Tsamis’ response “contained
information relating to her representation of [the client] and exceeded what
was necessary to respond to [the client’s] accusations.”124
Bar associations have weighed in on the applicability of Rule 1.6’s selfdefense exception to a lawyer’s response to online client reviews. Although
115. In re Skinner, 758 S.E.2d 788, 788 (Ga. 2014).
116. Id. at 789.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 790.
120.See Tsamis, Comm. File No. 2013PR00095 (Ill. 2013), https://www.iardc.org/rd_database/
rulesdecisions.html. (reprimanding an attorney for inappropriately revealing information online about
a former client).
121. Id. at ¶ 4.
122. Id. at ¶ 7–8.
123. Id. at ¶ 9–10.
124. Id. at ¶ 10.
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Rule 1.6 allows a lawyer to reveal information otherwise prohibited “to
establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between
the lawyer and the client . . . or to respond to allegations in any a proceeding
concerning the lawyer’s representation,”125 the Pennsylvania Bar
Association concluded that “a negative online client review is not a
circumstance that invokes the self-defense exception.”126 The Bar
Association of San Francisco similarly concluded that the self-defense
exception is inapplicable in the context of responding to a negative review.
That opinion concluded with:
Attorney is not barred from responding generally to an online review by a
former client where the former client’s matter has concluded. Although the
residual duty of loyalty owed to the former client does not prohibit a response,
Attorney’s on-going duty of confidentiality prohibits Attorney from disclosing
any confidential information about the prior representation absent the former
client’s informed consent or a waiver of confidentiality. California’s statutory
self-defense exception, as interpreted by California case law, has been limited
in application to claims by a client (against or about an attorney), or by an
attorney against a client, in the context of a formal or imminent legal
proceeding. Even in those circumstances where disclosure of otherwise
confidential information is permitted, the disclosure must be narrowly tailored
to the issues raised by the former client. If the matter previously handled for
the former client has not concluded, it may be inappropriate under the
circumstances for Attorney to provide any substantive response in the online
forum, even one that does not disclose confidential information.127

The Social Media Ethics Guidelines of the Commercial and Federal
Litigation Section of the New York State Bar Association issued the
following guideline:
Where a lawyer learns that a client has posted a review of her services on a
website or on social media, if the lawyer chooses to respond to the client’s
online review, the lawyer shall not reveal confidential information relating to
the representation of the client. This prohibition applies, even if the lawyer is
attempting to respond to unflattering comments posted by the client.128

To aid lawyers in responding to an unflattering post, the Pennsylvania Bar
Association has proposed a suggested response that a lawyer may ethically
125. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
126. Pa. Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility Comm., Formal Op. 2014-300 (2014).
127. The B. Ass’n of S.F. Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 2014-1 (2014).
128. Wicks et al., supra note 95, at 23.
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post in response to a negative review. That response is as follows:
A lawyer’s duty to keep client confidences has few exceptions and in an
abundance of caution I do not feel at liberty to respond in a point-by-point
fashion in this forum. Suffice it to say that I do not believe that the post
presents a fair and accurate picture of the events.129

Another rule implicated by a lawyer’s use of social media is Rule of
Professional Conduct 4.2, which prohibits a lawyer from communicating
with a party represented by counsel, unless the lawyer has been granted
permission by that party’s counsel.130 Ethics opinions analyzing the prior
consent provision of state analogs of Rule 4.2 have interpreted that
provision strictly. For example, the New York City Bar and North Carolina
State Bar have each concluded that Rule 4.2 prohibits a lawyer from sending
a “reply all” e-mail in response to an e-mail sent by opposing counsel, where
opposing counsel copied his or her client on the original e-mail, unless
opposing counsel has provided express or implied consent to do so.131
In the context of social media, the sending of a “friend request” has been
interpreted to constitute a communication in violation of Rule 4.2, where a
represented party’s counsel has not consented to the request.132 However,
accessing the public portion of a represented party’s social media website
has generally been found to be permissible.133 Accessing the public portion
of a party’s social media website, which is that portion that is available to
anyone who is a member of that particular social media network, is
analogous to “obtaining information that is available in publicly accessible
online or print media, or through a subscription research service such as
Nexis or Factiva, and that is plainly permitted.”134 Where a lawyer attempts
to access the private portions of a party’s social media, an ethical boundary
129. Pa. Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility Comm., Formal Op. 2014-200 (2014).
130 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“In representing a
client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer
knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other
lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or a court order.”). .
131. See N.C. State Bar, Formal Op. 7 (2013) (interpreting Rule 4.2 to prohibit an attorney from
responding to opposing counsel’s e-mail via “reply all” if opposing counsel has copied his client on the
e-mail and has not consented to his client being contacted); see also The Ass’n of the B. of the City of
N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l and Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 2009-1 (2009) (concluding absent consent, an
attorney cannot respond to opposing counsel’s e-mail using “reply all” if opposing counsel’s client was
copied on the original e-mail).
132. See, e.g., Pa. Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility Comm.., Formal Op. 2014-300
(2014) (“[T]his Committee also finds that ‘friending’ a represented party violates Rule 4.2.”).
133. Id.; see also N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 843 (2010).
134. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 843 (2010).
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may be crossed, because accessing the private portion entails sending a
request, i.e. a communication, to the party, which is, of course, prohibited if
that party is represented.135
On the other hand, where a party is unrepresented, sending a “friend
request” does not implicate Rule 4.2. However, lawyers must remain
mindful of their obligations in dealing with unrepresented parties, when
sending a “friend request” to a person not represented by counsel. Rule 4.3
requires that “a lawyer . . . not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested,”
when dealing with an unrepresented party on behalf of a client, and to
“make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding” the
unrepresented person may have regarding the lawyer’s role.136 While
communicating with an unrepresented party through social media is not
prohibited by the ban on lawyer contact with represented parties, the
Pennsylvania Bar Association concluded that an “attorney must use his or
her own name and state the purpose for contacting the individual” to
comply with the attorney’s ethical obligations in dealing with an
unrepresented party.137 Further, the lawyer must expressly state the
purpose of the request, because failing to do so would be implying that the
lawyer is disinterested, according to the opinion, in violation of Rule 4.3.138
While a number of bar associations have reached the conclusion that a
lawyer must state the purpose for a request to access the private portions of
an unrepresented party’s social media pages, as the Pennsylvania Bar
Association did, not all bar associations have reached this conclusion. The
Oregon State Bar determined that a request for access to the private portion
of an unrepresented party’s social media page “does not in and of itself make
a representation about the [l]awyer’s role.”139 Therefore, according to the
Oregon State Bar, the failure of the lawyer to state the purpose for a request
to access private social media pages of an unrepresented party does not
imply that the lawyer is disinterested. “On the contrary, it suggests that [the]
[l]awyer is interested in the person’s social networking information, although
135. See Pa. Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility Comm., Formal Op. 2014-300 (2014)
(“[A] request to access the represented party’s private page is a prohibited communication under
Rule 4.2.”).
136. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“In dealing on behalf
of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the
lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented
person misunderstands the lawyer’s role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to
correct the misunderstanding.”).
137. Pa. Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility Comm., Formal Op. 2014-300 (2014).
138. Id.
139. Or. State Bar Legal Ethics. Comm., Formal Op. 2013-189 (2013).
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for an unidentified purpose.”140 Further, because the social media account
holder has control over which persons are granted access to information
protected by privacy settings, “the holder’s failure to inquire further about
the identity or purpose of unknown access requestors is not the equivalent
of misunderstanding Lawyer’s role in the matter.”141 Thus, according to
the Oregon State Bar, a lawyer is not required to state the purpose of a
request to access the private portions of an unrepresented party’s social
media pages. However, if the party asks for additional information or the
“[l]awyer has some other reason to believe that the person misunderstands
[the lawyer’s] role, [then the] [l]awyer must provide the additional
information or withdraw the request.”142 Accordingly, there is a split of
authority regarding an attorney’s ethical obligations when contacting an
unrepresented party, in an attempt to gain access to that party’s private social
media pages.
In contrast with the standards for contacting a represented or
unrepresented party, ethics opinions have stated it is never permissible for
a lawyer to send a request to gain access to the private portions of a juror’s
or potential juror’s social media pages.143 Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 3.5 states a lawyer shall not “seek to influence a judge, juror,
prospective juror or other official by means prohibited by law” or
“communicate ex parte with such a person during the proceeding unless
authorized to do so by law or court order.”144 The ABA has concluded
that a lawyer’s review of the public portions of a juror or potential juror’s
social media presence does not constitute a violation of Model Rule 3.5.145
However, a request to view private portions of a juror or prospective juror’s
social media pages is considered “a communication to a juror asking the
juror for information that the juror has not made public.”146 “This would
be the type of ex parte communication prohibited by Model
Rule 3.5(b).”147 Therefore, although a lawyer may, under certain
circumstances, request access to a represented or unrepresented party’s
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. ABA Comm’n On Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 466 (2014) (“[A] lawyer may
passively review a juror’s public presence on the Internet, but may not communicate with a juror.
Requesting access to a private area on a juror’s [social media page] is communication within this
framework.”).
144. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.5(a)–(b) (AM. B. ASS’N 2016).
145. ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 466 (2014).
146. Id.
147. Id.
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private social media presence, a lawyer “may not . . . request . . . access [to]
the private portions of . . . a juror’s social networking website.”148
C. Online Communications with Prospective Clients
The ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 also proposed—and the ABA
adopted—revisions to Rule 1.18 (duties to a prospective client) to clarify the
applicability of that rule to online communications.149 One of the
Commission’s recommendations was to define a “prospective client” as one
who has “a reasonable expectation that the lawyer is willing to consider
forming a client–lawyer relationship.”150 The Commission believed this
proposed definition of a “prospective client” made the applicable standard
“more capable of application to electronic communications.”151 Although
Rule 1.18 does not currently define a prospective client in those terms,152
Comment 2 to Rule 1.18 now includes the following example:
[A] consultation does not occur if a person provides information to a lawyer
in response to advertising that merely describes the lawyer’s education,
experience, areas of practice, and contact information, or provides legal
information of general interest. Such a person communicates information
unilaterally to a lawyer, without any reasonable expectation that the lawyer is
willing to discuss the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship, and is
thus not a “prospective client.”153

Thus, the Commission’s recommendation regarding language that more
accurately applies to electronic communications provides guidance on the
applicability of Rule 1.18 to social media and other electronic
communications. Indeed, in the age of social media, lawyers should be
aware that participation in online discussions “may trigger duties owed to
prospective clients, including a risk of disqualification from representation
of an adverse party, fiduciary obligations, and malpractice liability (as well as
148. See Pa. Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility Comm., Formal Op. 2014-300 (2014)
(stating an attorney may access the public information of a juror’s social networking site, but a request
or attempt to access the private portions of the site would be a violation of Rule 3.5(b)).
149. Lackey, Jr. & Minta, supra note 2, at 154 (citing Press Release, A.B.A., ABA President Carolyn
B. Lamm Creates Ethics Commission to Address Technology and Global Practice Challenges Facing
U.S. Lawyers (Aug. 4, 2009)).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.18 (AM. B. ASS’N 2016) (“A person who
consults with a lawyer about the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a
matter is a prospective client.”).
153. Id. r. 1.18 cmt. 2.
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the possible unauthorized practice of law where an attorney provides legal
advice in a jurisdiction in which he or she is not licensed).”154
IV. CLIENT CONFIDENCES IN THE AGE OF THE CLOUD
One of the most significant technological advancements that implicates a
lawyer’s obligation to protect client confidences is the use of cloud
computing. Cloud computing is described as a “sophisticated form of
remote electronic data storage on the internet.”155 “Unlike traditional
methods that maintain data on a computer or server at a law office or other
place of business, data stored ‘in the cloud’ is kept on large servers located
elsewhere and maintained by a vendor.”156 Use of cloud computing can
provide lawyers with increased access to client data and provide clients with
increased access to their files over the Internet.157 Its use may also protect
against loss of data, where information is duplicated across multiple servers
and regular backups are performed.158
Not all services commonly or even fairly described as “cloud computing”
raise the same kind of risks for lawyers, because the phrase mostly describes
access by way of the Internet to a remote server on which data and
applications may be stored, without regard to who owns or controls the
servers and the links to it. No matter who owns the technology, however,
the lawyer or law firm that stores client confidential information on it has
an obligation to take reasonable steps to protect its confidentiality.159 Still,
where the lawyer or law firm “buys” the service of cloud storage of
confidential data on technology that the lawyer does not directly own or
control, as is the case in many “cloud” services, the risks are different, and
the lawyer’s obligations are different.160 The main risk affecting a lawyer’s
duty to protect client confidences in this context arises from the fact that
the information the lawyer is obligated to protect is not under the direct
154. Merri A. Baldwin, Ethical and Liability Risks Posed by Lawyers’ Use of Social Media, A.B.A.
(July 28, 2011), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/professional/articles/summer
2011-liability-social-media.html.
155. Ala. State Bar Disciplinary Comm’n., Op. 2010-02 (2010) (quoting Richard Acello, Get Your
Head in the Cloud, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2010, at 28, 28–29).
156. Id. (quoting Richard Acello, Get Your Head in the Cloud, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2010, at 28, 28).
157. Id.
158. See Meghan C. Lewallen, Note, Cloud Computing: A Laywer’s Ethical Duty to Act with Reasonable
Care When Storing Client Confidences “In the Cloud,” 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1133, 1139 (2013) (discussing
the benefits of cloud computing and how regular back-up and duplication of information across several
servers protect users from loss of data in the instance of hardware failure).
159. See id. at 1135 (arguing an attorney or law firm is required “to act with reasonable care when
storing client confidences in the cloud”).
160. Id. at 1141–43 (discussing risks of third party cloud services).
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control of the lawyer, but, instead, is stored on a vendor’s server.161 The
nature of cloud computing also means that an unauthorized third-party has
the potential to gain access to the vendor’s server and, thus, confidential
client information.162 The risk that information subject to a lawyer’s
Rule 1.6 obligation to protect will be accessed by unauthorized third-parties
is present not only in the context of cloud computing, but also by a lawyer’s
use of laptops, smartphones, tablets, and other modern technology that a
lawyer may utilize in their practice.
The reality of hacking and the risk it presents in the practice of law has
led to the addition of a new subpart (c) to Rule 1.6, which now provides that
“[a] lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or
unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, information relating
to the representation of a client.”163 Additionally, the Comment to Rule 1.6
now provides guidance regarding reasonableness in the context of steps
taken to prevent unauthorized access to client information. Revised
Comment [18] reads:
Paragraph (c) requires a lawyer to act competently to safeguard information
relating to the representation of a client against unauthorized access by third
parties and against inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure by the lawyer or
other persons who are participating in the representation of the client or who
are subject to the lawyer’s supervision. See Rules 1.1, 5.1 and 5.3. The
unauthorized access to, or the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of,
information relating to the representation of a client does not constitute a
violation of paragraph (c) if the lawyer has made reasonable efforts to prevent
the access or disclosure. Factors to be considered in determining the
reasonableness of the lawyer’s efforts include, but are not limited to, the
sensitivity of the information, the likelihood of disclosure if additional
safeguards are not employed, the cost of employing additional safeguards, the
difficulty of implementing the safeguards, and the extent to which the
safeguards adversely affect the lawyer’s ability to represent clients (e.g., by
making a device or important piece of software excessively difficult to use).
A client may require the lawyer to implement special security measures not
required by this Rule or may give informed consent to forgo security measures
161. See Ala. State Bar Disciplinary Comm’n., Op. 2010-02 (2010) (discussing an attorney’s ethical
responsibilities concerning the retention, ownership, production, storage, and destruction of client
files).
162. Id.
163. Peter Geraghty, Lucian T. Pera & Alfred J. Saikali, Lawyer’s Obligations to Provide Data Security
Arising from Ethics Rules and Other Law Specifically Governing Lawyers, in THE ABA CYBERSECURITY
HANDBOOK 62, 63 (Jill D. Rhodes & Vincent I. Polley eds., 2013) (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 1.6(c) (AM. B. ASS’N 1983)).
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that would otherwise be required by this Rule. Whether a lawyer may be
required to take additional steps to safeguard a client’s information in order
to comply with other law, such as state and federal laws that govern data
privacy or that impose notification requirements upon the loss of, or
unauthorized access to, electronic information, is beyond the scope of these
Rules. For a lawyer’s duties when sharing information with nonlawyers
outside the lawyer’s own firm, see Rule 5.3, Comments [3]-[4].164

Revised Comment 19 now reads:
When transmitting a communication that includes information relating to the
representation of a client, the lawyer must take reasonable precautions to
prevent the information from coming into the hands of unintended recipients.
This duty, however, does not require that the lawyer use special security
measures if the method of communication affords a reasonable expectation
of privacy. Special circumstances, however, may warrant special precautions.
Factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the lawyer’s
expectation of confidentiality include the sensitivity of the information and
the extent to which the privacy of the communication is protected by law or
by a confidentiality agreement. A client may require the lawyer to implement
special security measures not required by this Rule or may give informed
consent to the use of means of communication that would otherwise be
prohibited by this Rule. Whether a lawyer may be required to take additional
steps in order to comply with other law, such as state and federal laws that
govern data privacy, is beyond the scope of these Rules.165

Although cloud computing presents the risk that confidential client
information will be accessed by third-parties, ethics opinions that have
examined the issue have not deemed the risk severe enough to warrant a
prohibition of cloud computing in the practice of law. In fact, the use of
cloud computing has generally been approved, subject to appropriate
precautions being put in place.166 In 2006, the Nevada State Bar concluded
that an attorney “may use an outside agency to store confidential client
information in electronic forms, and on hardware located outside the
attorney’s direct supervision and control, so long as the attorney observes
the usual obligations applicable to such arrangements for third party storage
164. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6, cmt. 18 (AM. B. ASS’N 2016).
165. See id. r. 1.6, cmt. 19.
166. See Cloud Ethics Opinions Around the U.S., A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/
groups/departments_offices/legal_technology_resources/resources/charts_fyis/cloud-ethicschart.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) [hereinafter Cloud Ethics Opinions Around the U.S.] , for an
extensive list of ethics opinions addressing the use of cloud computing.
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services.”167 In 2010, the Alabama Disciplinary Commission agreed,
stating that “a lawyer may use ‘cloud computing’ or third-party providers to
store client data provided that the attorney exercises reasonable care in
doing so.”168 That duty of reasonable care requires a lawyer “to become
knowledgeable about how the provider will handle the storage and security
of the data being stored and to reasonably ensure that the provider will abide
by a confidentiality agreement in handling the data.”169 “Additionally,
because technology is constantly evolving, the lawyer will have a continuing
duty to stay abreast of appropriate security safeguards that should be
employed by the lawyer and the third-party provider.”170
The Arizona State Bar has similarly concluded that a lawyer “should
periodically review security measures in place to ensure that they still
reasonably protect the security and confidentiality of the clients’ documents
and information.”171 The Arizona opinion also provided examples of steps
a lawyer should take to comply with the duty of reasonable care, which
included the use of “firewalls, password protection schemes, encryption,
anti-virus measures, etc.”172 However, the duty of reasonable care “does
not require a guarantee that the system will be invulnerable to unauthorized
access.”173 Nonetheless, the Arizona Bar quoted with approval a New
Jersey ethics opinion, which stated that a lawyer “is required to exercise
sound professional judgment on the steps necessary to secure client
confidences against foreseeable attempts at unauthorized access.”174 The
duty of reasonable care espoused by these and other state ethics opinions
has been described as follows:
In short, a lawyer cannot take the “ostrich” approach of hiding his head in the
sand and hoping that his office or firm will not suffer a data breach that
compromises client information. Lawyers must implement administrative,
technical, and physical safeguards to meet their obligation to make reasonable
efforts to protect client information.175

State bars have further weighed in on what techniques are appropriate to
implement to protect against data breaches and inadvertent disclosures of
167. Nev. State Bar Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. No. 33 (2006).
168. Ala. State Bar Disciplinary Comm’n, Op. 2010-02 (2010)
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Ariz. State Bar Comm. on Prof’l Conduct, Op. 09-04 (2009).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. (quoting N.J. B. Ethics Op. 701 (2006)).
175. Geraghty, Pera & Saikali, supra note 163, at 64.
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client information. For example, the Virginia State Bar concluded that the
proper level of care requires that a lawyer “examine the third party
provider’s use of technology and terms of service in order to know whether
it adequately safeguards client information, and if the lawyer is not able to
make this assessment on her own, she will have to consult with someone
qualified to make that determination.”176 The Maine Board of Bar
Overseers went further and provided a list of internal policies and
procedures that a lawyer should implement to satisfy their obligations under
the Maine Rules of Professional Conduct and a separate list of safeguards
that should be adopted to deal with a third-party cloud vendor.177 The
internal policies and procedures suggested by the Maine Board are as
follows:
1.

backing up data to allow the firm to restore data that has been lost,
corrupted, or accidentally deleted;
2. installing a firewall to limit access to the firm’s network;
3. limiting information that is provided to others to what is required, needed,
or requested;
4. avoiding inadvertent disclosure of information;
5. verifying the identity of individuals to whom the attorney provides
confidential information;
6. refusing to disclose confidential information to unauthorized individuals
(including family members and friends) without client permission;
7. protecting electronic records containing confidential data, including
backups, by encrypting the confidential data;
8. implementing electronic audit trail procedures to monitor who is
accessing the data;
9. creating plans to address security breaches, including the identification of
persons to be notified about any known or suspected security breach
involving confidential data; and
10. educating and training employees of the firm who use cloud computing
to abide by all end-user security measures, including, but not limited to,
the creation of strong passwords and the regular replacement of
passwords.178

The Maine Board also concluded that a lawyer should ensure the vendor of
cloud computing services or hardware:

176. Va. State Bar, Op. 1872 (2013).
177. See Me. Bd. of Overseers of the Bar, Op. No. 207 (2013) (addressing how changes in
technology over time affect the way the ethical constraints on counsel are satisfied).
178. Id.
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explicitly agrees that it has no ownership or security interest in the data;
has an enforceable obligation to preserve security;
will notify the lawyer if requested to produce data to a third party, and
provide the lawyer with the ability to respond to the request before the
provider produces the requested information;
has technology built to withstand a reasonably foreseeable attempt to
infiltrate data, including penetration testing;
provides the firm with the right to audit the provider’s security procedures
and to obtain copies of any security audits performed;
will host the firm’s data only within a specified geographic area. If the
date is hosted outside of the United States, the law firm must determine
that the hosting jurisdiction has privacy laws, data security laws, and
protections against unlawful search and seizure that are as rigorous as
those of the United States and Maine;
provides the ability for the law firm, on demand, to get data from the
vendor’s or third-party data hosting company’s servers for the firm’s own
use or for in-house backup.179

The Massachusetts Bar Association has also weighed in on cloud
computing. Following its review of reasonable measures that should be
taken to protect confidential client information, the Massachusetts Bar
reminded lawyers that, regardless of their choice to use cloud computing
services, they remain “bound to follow an express instruction from [a] client
that [their] confidential information not be stored or transmitted by . . . the
Internet, and . . . should refrain from storing or transmitting particularly
sensitive client information by means of the Internet without first seeking
and obtaining the client’s express consent . . . .”180
Prior to storing client information in the cloud, lawyers would be wise to
consult the ABA’s compilation of ethics opinions regarding the use of cloud
computing to locate that jurisdiction’s opinion regarding the appropriate
steps to implement when using cloud computing.181
V. CONCLUSION
The introduction of new technology to the practice of law, such as social
media and cloud computing, often provides lawyers with an increased
opportunity to market their services and manage their practices more
efficiently. However, these technology developments may present new
179. Id.
180. Mass. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 12-03 (2012).
181. See Cloud Ethics Opinions Around the U.S., supra note 166, for a chart comparing ethics opinions
regarding cloud computing across different jurisdictions.
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ways for lawyers to run afoul of their ethical obligations. Moreover, the
applicable ethics rules are often outpaced by the technological
advancements. Thus, it is important for lawyers to be mindful of their
existing ethical obligations in the context of new scenarios that may be
presented by their use of new technologies.

